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VOLUME 49 FAmL 1974 NUMBER 1
"THAT'S THE MAN": A SOBERING STUDY
OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
AND THE POLYGRAPHt
FRANK O'CONNOR*
It is almost four o'clock in the morning, and, as he stands in the
lighted doorway of the squad room at the 110th precinct, Manny Bal-
estrero is tired - but, worse still, he is scared, more scared than he has
ever been in his life. Things seem to be closing in around him. His
interrogation since earlier that evening has not, by any standard, been
brutal; no force has been used-just persistent, relentless, ceaseless
questioning by two detectives who are so skeptically polite, so ada-
mantly unbelievingl'
The heavier-set detective now directs Manny to don his gray tweed
overcoat, his maroon muffler, and his hat and to stand in the doorway.
Manny is quickly aware that people are looking at him from the dark-
ened doorway across the hall. He cannot see them but he senses they
are there and his terror mounts. He was later to say, "When things like
that happen and you're innocent, you want to shout and scream and
you can't. I tried in many ways to tell them that I was innocent but
they acted all the time as if I were guilty" 2
The drama moves swiftly to its bitter end. Manny again senses,
t @ 1974 by Frank O'Connor. This article was specially prepared for the St. John's
Law Review.
Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County.
From the vantage point of ten years as District Attorney of Queens County (1956-66)
and six years on the trial bench (1969 to present), the writer holds in high regard the
professional competence and personal integrity of most policemen. Laudable instances
of police efforts to clear a doubtful suspect are legion. Deliberate, willful efforts to frame
or railroad an innocent man are totally unknown, at least to me. Yet, once the best-in-
tentioned officer becomes honestly convinced that he has the right man, human nature
being what it is, corners may be cut, some of the niceties forgotten, and serious error
committed.
2 Brean, A Case of Identity, LwE, June 29, 1953, at 98 [hereinafter cited as Brean].
For a follow-up story, see id., Feb. 6, 1954, at 45. See also REAImR's DiGFsr, Oct. 1953, at 86.
The story was carried on Robert Montgomery's coast-to-coast television show. Under
the title "The Wrong Man," it became a full-length motion picture, produced by Warner
Brothers, under the direction of Alfred Hitchcock.
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rather than sees, movement in the darkened room. Then come the
whispered words: "That's the man!" Manny's whole world collapses.
Manny was arrested and spent the night in jail. Shortly thereafter,
his wife, Rose, an intelligent and sensitive woman, beside herself with
worry over the plight of her husband, suffered a complete collapse. The
utter sorrow and injustice of it all seared my soul as few things have
before or since. Thus, the groundwork was laid for one of the most
dramatic and disturbing "wrong man" cases of modem times.
Not to hold you, gentle reader, in prolonged suspense, the trial of
Balestrero terminated in a mistrial. Before the People's case was half
presented, juror number four, in a voice loud and clear and audible to
one and all, expressed his intense annoyance at the probing and search-
ing cross-examination then being conducted by defense counsel, this
writer. His prejudice was obvious, and the mistrial followed.3
A date was set for a new trial, but in the interim the real perpe-
trator was apprehended while committing another armed robbery. His
name was Charles J. Daniell. He resembled Balestrero only remotely,
and he quickly absolved him of any complicity in the crimes charged.
On the night of his arrest and while handcuffed to a chair in the old
114th precinct, Daniell stated to this writer that had Balestrero been
convicted he, Daniell, would have returned to the scene and reenacted
in every minute detail the original robbery to prove to the police that
poor Balestrero was the wrong man. Irony of ironies!
In the context of this article, it is interesting to note that shortly
after his arrest and at the prompting of this writer, Balestrero, at his
own expense, underwent a lie detector test. As the test was about to
begin and the electrodes were being prepared, Balestrero began to shake
like a reed in the wind. Knowing full well his innocence, grasping my
hand like a little child, he piteously exclaimed, "What will happen if
this machine says I'm lying?" He was not lying; the polygraph affirmed
he was telling the truth, but all in vain. The results of the test would
not be admissible at the trial.
Additional facts in the tragic tale of Balestrero will be subsequently
recounted, but for the moment it is appropriate to reflect upon the
observations of the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade:4
The trial which might determine the accused's fate may well not
be that in the courtroom but at the pretrial confrontation, with the
State aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury,.. . and
3 Brean, supra note 2, at 104.
4 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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with little or no effective appeal from the judgment there rendered
by the witness - "that's the man." 5
CONVICTING THE WRONG MAN
The stark horror of convicting the wrong man has always plagued
bench and bar alike. Indeed, this problem prompted a provocative
study over forty years ago entitled Convicting the Innocent.6 Professor
Borchard outlined 65 cases of criminal prosecutions and convictions
where the defendants were totally innocent. In more than half of these
cases the tragic error was occasioned by the wrongful identification by
the victim of the crime. Professor Borchard's work lists some of the
factors usually present in identification cases and offers impressive
statistics indicating the almost total lack of probative value of such
testimony. It says, in part:
Juries seem disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reli-
ability of the victims of an outrage than any amount of contrary
evidence by or on behalf of the accused, whether by way of alibi,
character witnesses, or other testimony. These cases illustrate the
fact that the emotional balance of the victim or eyewitness is so
disturbed by his extraordinary experience that his powers of per-
ception become distorted and his identification is frequently most
untrustworthy. Into the identification enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally- the
desire to requite a crime, to exact vengeance upon the person be-
lieved guilty, to find a scapegoat, to support, consciously or uncon-
sciously, an identification already made by another. Thus doubts
are resolved against the accused. How valueless are these identifi-
cations by the victim of a crime is indicated by the fact that in
eight of these cases the wrongfully accused person and the really
guilty criminal bore not the slightest resemblance to each other,
whereas in twelve other cases, the resemblance, while fair, was still
not at all close. In only two cases can the resemblance be called
striking.7
It is equally chilling to learn that in many instances the crimes of
which the defendants were accused never even took place. One classic
example is the trial of the Boom brothers in Vermont in the year 1819.
Although the conviction of the two brothers was partially due to their
spurious confession to a totally shocking crime which, unbelievably,
never took place, the case is worthy of note as an early American case
s Id. at 235-36.
6E. BoRmAm, CONvIctING THE INNOCENT (1932) [hereinafter cited as BORCHARD].
7Id. at xiii (footnotes omitted). See also Williams & Hammelmann, Identification
Parades-Il, [1963] Casr. L. REv. (Eng.) 479, 483, on the unconscious suggestive influ-
ences surrounding the lineup procedure.
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involving mistaken identity. The Boom brothers were convicted of the
murder of their brother-in-law and were sentenced to be hanged. But
for a curious concatenation of circumstances which brought about the
discovery of the alleged victim, alive, hale and hearty, many miles from
the site of his alleged demise, they would have been executed. As is so
frequently true in these cases, the links in the chain which finally dis-
closed the truth were as accidental and fortuitous as those which led to
the mistaken conviction.
The trial of Thomas Berdue, an early California case, would be
totally ludicrous except for its tragic overtones. Drawn by the gold
fever, many adventurers flocked to the Golden State in the middle of
the nineteenth century. Murders and robberies were rampant, and were
committed with apparent impunity. Law-abiding citizens became in-
creasingly enraged at the uninterrupted wave of crime. A particularly
vicious assault and robbery of a leading merchant took place, followed
by a cold-blooded murder of another citizen. A totally innocent British
subject, Thomas Berdue, was arrested, indicted, tried, and convicted of
both crimes and sentenced to be hanged.
An extraordinarily detailed and impressive description of the sus-
pect is to be found in the following summary of the eyewitnesses'
testimony:
Witnesses for the prosecution were generally bold and entirely
positive; but the witnesses for the prisoner with the exception of
Judge Stidger and B. F. Washington, appeared to feel uneasy, and
often hesitated in their testimony. Some three or four witnesses tes-
tified that they had worked with Jim Stuart at Foster Bar, and had
known him well before he went there. They had eaten with him
at the same table often, and had played cards with him; and one or
two testified they had slept with him. They testified that Jim Stuart
was of the same height as the prisoner; that he had curly hair,
like him; that he was slightly bald on the top of the head, like him;
that his actions were like his - the court having made the prisoner
stand up several times so that the witnesses could see him better
than when sitting; that his voice and accent were the same, being
English; that the color of the eyes and hair were the same; and that
Jim Stuart had a stiff middle finger on the right hand, and a ring
of Indian-ink round one of his fingers, and marks of Indian-ink
between each thumb and forefinger; and further, that Jim Stuart
had a rather long scar on his right cheek. The jury then examined
the hands of the prisoner, and there was found a ring of Indian-ink
on one of his fingers, several figures or spots of the same ink betveen
the thumb and forefinger of each hand; and the right middle finger
was not stiff, but had had a felon under the nail of the correspond-
ing finger on the other hand, which had given it a short but stubby
[Vol. 49:1
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appearance, heavier at the end than elsewhere, the nail of the finger
being broad and thick, and bending inward over the end of the
finger. This was startling to the defence, indeed. It remained now
to see if the prisoner had a scar on the right side of the face. His
face could not be satisfactorily examined, as it was almost com-
pletely covered with a short growth of hair. The court ordered
the prisoner to be shaved before being brought into court next
morning, and on being examined a scar about the length of the
one described by the witnesses was found, commencing on the edge
of the jaw on the right side and running down the neck. The wit-
nesses now seemed confident, and said that they had no doubt that
the prisoner was Jim Stuart. On a cross-examination they said, in
a positive and unhesitating manner, that it was not possible that
they could be mistaken in their opinion that the prisoner was Jim
Stuart. Colonel Prentiss swore positively that the prisoner was
Jim Stuart and that he could not possibly be mistaken. Some four
or five witnesses swore positively as to the identity of the prisoner,
and that he was Jim Stuart beyond a question; each giving some
one or more new reasons for his belief. No witness on the side of
the prosecution would admit a probability that he could be mis-
taken in the prisoner; that he certainly was Jim Stuart! s
This lengthy extract demonstrates the kind of detailed, particularized
positive identification offered in absolute good faith by eyewitnesses
who can so often be totally mistaken.
Needless to say, despite competent evidence of a perfectly sound
;?d truthful alibi, Berdue was convicted on all counts at each of his
three trials. As in the case of Boom, through a purely fortuitous chain
of circumstances, the real James Stuart was subsequently apprehended
and, in a signed confession, completely exonerated the hapless Berdue.
The problem of mistaken eyewitness identification received fur-
ther attention from a Royal Committee of Inquiry established in 1904
to investigate one of England's famous wrong man cases. It concluded:
[E]vidence as to identity based on personal impressions, however
bona fide, is perhaps of all classes of evidence the least to be relied
upon, and therefore, unless supported by other facts, an unsafe basis
for the verdict of a jury.9
A similar word of caution had been expressed in one of America's most
celebrated and controversial criminal trials, in which the identification
procedures employed, and the identification testimony introduced, were
excoriated by Felix Frankfurter, who exclaimed:
8 BoRcHA D, supra note 6, at 271-72.
) E. WATSON, AnoLr BEcK 250 (1924). The Royal Committee of Inquiry was appointed
as a result of the trials involving one Adolf Beck, who was twice convicted in England
for crimes he did not commit.
1974]
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What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontra-
dicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.
The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable
number of instances in the records of English and American trials.
These instances are recent -not due to the brutalities of ancient
criminal procedure. 10
BACK TO BALESTRERO
Let us now return to the squad room at the 110th precinct. Ear-
lier, prior to this "private showing," Manny had been directed by the
police to write in block letters the identical message appearing on the
hold-up note used in one of the robberies he is suspected of committing.
That note read in part, "[G]ive me the money from the cash draw [sic]."
Balestrero printed out five copies of the note with no visible reaction
from the police, but when on the sixth try, he, too, misspelled the word
"draw" the police "knew" they had the right man.1 '
A lineup is ordered, but it is well on to 5:00 A.M. and the police
are hard-pressed to form one. Finally, the desk lieutenant and a police
officer, their uniform trousers clearly visible below the hastily-donned
civilian overcoats, stand beside the visibly crushed and totally demoral-
ized Balestrero. On his other side is placed the husband of one of the
identifying witnesses. Balestrero is positively identified by four young
girls as the man who had robbed on two different occasions the insur-
ance office where they worked.
The total inadequacy and the inherent unfairness of these entire
proceedings involving Balestrero, Boom, Berdue and legions of others
strongly suggest the imperative need for objective safeguards in this all
too long neglected area of the criminal law.12
10 F. FRANKURTmER, THE CASE OF SACco AN VNrrI 30 (1927).
11The holdup note read: "This is a gun I have pointing at you be quiet and you
will not be hurt. Give me the money from the cash draw [sic]."
12 Indeed, the need was known in Canada 33 years ago. In Rex v. Goldhar, [1941] 2
D.L.R. 480, the Ontario Court of Appeals said:
It would be well, however, if in the evidence at the trial the procedure followed
on the occasion of the line-up were described in more detail than is usually done.
At least two things should be made clearly to appear that are seldom even re-
ferred to in evidence.
First, it should appear that there has been nothing whatever done to indicate
to the witness the person in the line-up who is suspected by the police, either by
showing a photograph or description, or an indication of the position in the
line-up. In the second place it should appear that the selection of the other per-
son [sic] to form the line-up has been made fairly, so that the suspect will not be
conspicuously different from all the others in age or build, colour or complexion
or custome or in any other particular. Where these precautions have been ob-
served and it so appears by the evidence, identification by means of a line-up be-
comes much more convincing to a Judge or jury than the mere statement that on
a line-up the witness picked out the accused.
Id. at 480-81.
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CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDs AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATIONS
It was not until June 12, 1967, that the Supreme Court estab-
lished constitutional safeguards and sanctions. In Wades the Court
gave explicit recognition to the deficiencies of the process of pretrial
identification:
[he confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and
the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is
peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors
which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. 14
To minimize the potential for injustice, the Court in Wade, Gil-
bert v. California,6 and Stovall v. Dennol6 mandated first, that in any
pretrial confrontation the procedures must be fair in every respect. 17
Examples of unduly suggestive procedures include those in which (1)
the suspect is the only person in the lineup unknown to the witness;
(2) the suspect's appearance is grossly dissimilar from that of the other
participants; (3) only the suspect wears distinctive clothing allegedly
worn by the actual perpetrator; (4) the suspect is brought in for a one-
on-one identification after the witness is told that the culprit has been
caught; (5) the suspect is pointed out by the police before the lineup.U
As an additional measure of protection, the Court extended the right
to counsel to the lineup procedure. 9
The Court then imposed a major sanction to enforce these pro-
tections - the exclusion from the trial of in-court identification testi-
mony whenever the constitutional standards of Wade-Gilbert-Stovall
are violated.20 If, for example, a defendant lacks counsel at the lineup,
the witness' in-court identification will be inadmissible unless the prose-
cution establishes by "clear and convincing" evidence that the in-court
identification is based upon the witness' observations at the time of the
crime and not upon the lineup procedure.2 Factors relevant to this
inquiry include the witness' opportunity and motivation to observe
the criminal act, the time lapse between the commission of the crime
13 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
14 Id. at 228.
15 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
16 388 US. 293 (1967).
17 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233-35 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 272-74 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1967).
18 388 US. at 233.
19 Id. at 237.
201 d. at 238.
21 Id. at 240.
19741
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and the identification procedure, the accuracy of the witness' descrip-
tion given immediately after the crime, and the degree of certainty
demonstrated by the witness in selecting the defendant.22 A year later,
the Court held that whenever a pretrial photographic identification
procedure is "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification," the in-court iden-
tification is also to be excluded.23
In his excellent article entitled "Assailing the Impermissible Sug-
gestion: Evolving Limitation on the Abuse of Pre-trial Criminal Iden-
tification Methods,"' 4 Judge Sobel writes:
From that perspective, the potential conviction of the innocent, the
Wade trilogy represents the most important of the Court's criminal
decisions of the past several decades. Although Mapp and Miranda
are better known and more frequently encountered, neither has a
direct bearing on guilt or innocence. The target of Mapp and
Miranda is official misconduct; these decisions protect the integrity
of the judicial process. Even high court judges fail to understand
that in addition to assuring fairness in prosecution, these decisions
add to the speed and efficiency of criminal prosecutions. Wade,
Gilbert and Stovall perform all these functions as well as protecting
the innocent from unjust conviction.25
While it is quite clear that these safeguards will help to reduce the
number of wrong man convictions, Judge Sobel cautions that the ex-
tent of those beneficial results will depend, to a large degree, upon
how realistically the courts enforce the mandated standards. He ex-
presses a reservation shared by many of his confreres:
[I]t is quite evident that there has existed a state of confusion
among lawyers and trial judges concerning the implementation of
the constitutional safeguards. This is due in measure to the fact
that Wade-Gilbert-Stovall left many problems unsolved.26
Unfortunately, in recent years the Court has exhibited a dimin-
ished judicial concern in the area of suggestive pretrial identification
procedures. Wade, itself, has been specifically limited to post-indictment
procedures by the decision in Kirby V. Illinois.27 More recently, the
Court refused to extend the right to counsel to photographic identifica-
22 Id. at 241. See also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
28 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
24 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 261 (1971). Hon. Nathan R. Sobel, a former Justice of the
New York State Supreme Court, is now Surrogate, Kings County.
25 Id. at 262.
26 Id.
27 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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don procedures. 28 The Court has expressed its belief that the suspect
is afforded substantial protection against impermissible suggestions
through the integrity of the prosecutor:
In many ways the prosecutor, by accident or by design, may im-
properly subvert the trial. The primary safeguard against abuses
of this kind is the ethical responsibility of the prosecution, who, as
so often has been said, may "strike hard blows" but not "foul
ones."
29
Even if there were to develop a more favorable judicial attitude
toward the Wade protections and the ethical probity of prosecutors
could be assured, there still remains a grave danger of misidentification.
According to one authority cited by the Wade Court, "[T]he influence
of improper suggestion [intentional or unintentional] probably accounts
for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor - perhaps
it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined." 0
Suggestibility has been defined as "the readiness with which an
individual will fill in the missing details that are absent from the sug-
gestion."3' Psychological experiments have established that most indi-
viduals are unconsciously susceptible to different forms of suggestions.
The following cases are illustrative:
A professor sprayed water around the classroom and asked the stu-
dents to raise their hands when they detected an odor. 75% of the
students raised their hands. Another professor played two identical
phonograph recordings after having made the false statement that
music critics had selected one of the two as the better. He asked the
students to indicate which of the two was better. 96.6% of his
listeners selected one or the other, although there was no dif-
ference.8 2
Some suggestive elements are by their nature incapable of being
controlled.8 A research study appearing in the December, 1974 Scien-
tific American outlines a number of controlled experiments which
28 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
29 Id. at 520.
80 P. VALL, EymvrrNrEss IDENTrIFIcATION IN CPRIMNAL CASs 26 (1965).
31 DOCEmRy, PSYCHOLOGY 214-15 (1944). See also The Case Against Personal Identifica-
tion, 13 FORTNIGHTLY L.J. 387, 887-88 (1943), wherein suggestion is defined as "the com-
munication of any proposition from one person to another in such a way as to secure its
acceptance."
32 FouRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JuDicIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF Nmv Yon,
233, 240 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Nmv YoRx REPORT].I 8 Id. at 240-42. See Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The
Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973), for a summary of experimental
research on perception and recall.
1974]
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graphically demonstrate the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testi-
mony. 4 The study isolates a number of factors contributing to this un-
reliability. Among them are the apparent insignificance of the original
event, the length of period of the observation, the observer's overall
physical condition, the stress of the situation, and the expectancy of the
observer3 5 But even assuming ideal conditions for the original percep-
don at the scene of the crime, the element of suggestion during the
lineup can be the deciding factor in identification of the suspect. For
example, the very fact that the witness has been called to the police
station predisposes him to select someone as the culprit. Naturally, he
will pick out the person who most nearly resembles the image he has
in mind. 8 Thus, there remains a grave doubt that the safeguards af-
forded by Wade and its successors are an adequate protection against
convicting persons who are totally innocent of any crime.3 7
Posn-Wade CASES
Two recent post-Wade wrong man cases must be evaluated in the
context of the protections now mandated. In the unreported case of
People v. Berson, the defendant was arrested following a series of shock-
ing rapes, robberies, and sodomies. He was promptly placed in a lineup
and immediately and positively identified by four of the young women
victims. Several weeks later two more victims came forward and, once
again, Berson was positively identified as the assailant. Defendant's
counsel,38 experienced and knowledgeable, not only was present at the
second lineup but also was permitted to assist the police in putting it
together. He was satisfied that those in the lineup were comparable to
his client in height, weight, coloring, and general appearance.
An extraordinary and highly suggestive factor unintentionally en-
tered the picture. By sheer accident the suspect was placed directly
under an overhead light, and a shadow was thrown directly across the
mouth and chin area. Since childhood, the defendant had had a harelip,
and corrective surgery had left an obvious scar. Perhaps in an effort to
lessen its impact, the suspect had grown a rather straggly moustache,
but no hair, of course, grew over the proud flesh of the scar. Yet, in
S4 Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, SciE=nFic AMERIcAN, Dec., 1974, at 23.
35 Id. at 25-26.
SO New York REPoRT, supra note 32, at 248.
3 7 See generally Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitation
on the Abuse of Pre-trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BRooKLYN L. REv. 261
(1971); Comment, No Panacea: Constitutional Supervision of Eyewitness Identification, 62
J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 363 (1971); Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures -Wade to Gil-
bert to Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REv. 779 (1971).
8 Berson's lawyer was James Mulvaney, a former Assistant District Attorney, Queens
County, who had served on the staff of the writer.
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the shadow cast by the light, the entire upper lip appeared as if entirely
covered with a moustache. It was later discovered that the real culprit
had a full moustache.
It is both interesting and significant to note that the defendant,
at his own expense and upon his attorney's advice, had a polygraph
examination taken, which indicated that he was telling the truth.
It was not until some weeks later, prior to the defendant's trial,
that another person was ascertained to be the true perpetrator of these
crimes and was picked out of the lineup by all of the victims save one,
who still persisted in her positive identification of the first defendant
as her attacker.39 The Berson case clearly establishes that even under
Wade the possibilities of suggestive occurrences, conscious or uncon-
scious, intentional or unintentional, remain virtually untouched.
Additional recognition of this suggestibility came in a report of
the August 1973 Queens County Grand Jury, handed up in connection
with another wrong man case. After completely exonerating the suspect
by voting a no true bill, the report, at length and in detail, indicated
that serious flaws still exist in the composition and mechanics of present-
day lineups.
Briefly, the defendant William Schrager, an Assistant District At-
torney on the staff of the Queens County Prosecutor's Office, 40 was
arrested on serious morals charges after being identified by two young
women in a lineup held at the 100th Precinct in Rockaway Beach. As
noted by the grand jury, "The Schrager lineup provides a classic illus-
tration of the shortcomings existing in lineup procedures." The report
calls attention to the fact that the defendant, a caucasian male, five feet
four inches tall with a receding hairline, a nonathletic build and pos-
sessed of an unusual voice, was placed in a lineup with five policemen
and detectives, all of whom were over five feet eight inches in height.
To further compound the situation, two of the participants were over
five feet ten inches tall and weighed over two hundred pounds, and two
others were drawn from the uniformed ranks and wore civilian shirts
but retained their blue uniform trousers.
so It is noteworthy that after the conviction and sentencing of Carbone, the per-
petrator, one Morales, was arrested and held by the New York County District Attorney's
Office on the charge of attacking a young lady in Manhattan. When Carbone heard of
this, he readily confessed to that attack and, upon request, took a polygraph examination.
The results of that test proved that he was telling the truth concerning all of the attacks
to which he had confessed. i
40 Because of the defendant's connection with the district attorney's office, two spe-
cial prosecutors were appointed. Howard D. Stave and Douglas H. Kreiger, both former
a~istant district attorneys on the staff of the writer. The grand jury report was prepared
Ulder their supervision.
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The report describes the woefully inadequate physical facilities
available in the ancient stationhouse of the 100th Precinct and then
makes a series of recommendations, including the setting up of a cen-
tral location adequately staffed and equipped for all future lineups
throughout the city. It suggests the installation of modem audio equip-
ment at the central lineup facility and that provision be made through
computerization to call up on short notice from the ranks of the police
and their auxiliary a sufficient number of look-alikes to conduct a
proper lineup. It further recommends that stenographic, video tape,
and audio recordings be made of the lineup and of all law enforcement
personnel and viewing witnesses.
Both Berson and the Schrager case dearly indicate that despite the
sanctions and procedures of Wade, and assuming all the foregoing sug-
gested recommendations are carried out, something more is needed. The
crying need for an objective standard is apparent. While the grand
jury's proposals are a step in the right direction, nevertheless there
remains a disturbing potential for error whenever a conviction rests
solely upon the identification testimony of strangers to the defendant.
Prior Search For A Standard
In 1945, the sensitivities of New Yorkers, always alert to the cry
of injustice, were deeply aroused by the sad story of Bertram M. Camp-
bell, another wrong man.41 The public was incensed at this incredible
miscarriage of justice and, as a result, the Governor's counsel brought
the entire problem to the attention of the New York State Judicial
Council, which authorized a study of the problem of lessening the like-
lihood of erroneous identification. In the prelude to a truly excellent
report the council stated in part:
Were the Campbell case merely an isolated instance, it would still
furnish cause for inquiry into the possibility of improving methods
of identification. Our civilization is grounded upon the sanctity of
individual rights. More than lip service should be paid to the adage
41 Campbell, a totally innocent man, was convicted of the crime of forgery even
though he bore but a slight resemblance to the actual perpetrator. By the time the mis-
take had been discovered, he had served three years in state prison. The press revealed
that three of the five identifying witnesses had been shown a photograph of Campbell
by private detectives, apparently representing the banks involved. In the photo a mous-
tache had been "dubbed in" to meet the description of the actual criminal and the wit-
nesses had been informed that Campbell was a front for a big forgery ring. Worse still,
Campbell was pointed out to the witnesses before the identification took place and no
lineup at all was ever held. These three witnesses were later heard to say that if they
had not studied the photograph in advance and had not been told that Campbell was
part of a forgery ring, they would not have identified him as the criminal.
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that it is better that a guilty person go free than that an innocent
person should be punished.
Unfortunately, however, there have been more Campbell cases
than is generally realized. The annals of criminal law contain a
number of miscarriages of justice resulting from erroneous identifi-
cation. The view has been expressed that there have been many
more such cases which have never been verified.
The statement that there have been many such cases means
that over a long period of time a relatively large number of such
cases has been discovered. It is not intended to suggest that mistakes
in identity are a regular occurrence or that they occur frequently
in cases that go to trial. Nonetheless the gravity of such mistakes
cannot be overemphasized. 42
The purpose of the project was "to determine the feasibility of
erecting safeguards against erroneous identification by legislation or
court rule."4 To this end four possible approaches to the problem were
explored and the indicated conclusions were reached:
(1) The Council first studied but quickly rejected the advis-
ability of admitting into evidence the results of psychological tests
of a witness' capacity for recognition. Their research indicated that
there is no consistency in the testimonial accuracy of individuals,
that a witness may be very accurate in reporting one incident and
very inaccurate in reporting the next.
(2) It then explored the possibility of mandating by statute the
method of confronting the suspect with the witness. This, too, was
promptly rejected as a matter not for legislative enactment but of
police regulation.
(3) The Council then considered a statutory prohibition
against convictions based solely on identification testimony. It was
concluded that to ban such evidence- in many cases the only
evidence- would be not only unscientific but would tend to en-
courage crime.
(4) Finally, the Council made an in-depth study of recognition
of the lie detector test. Its conclusion was stated in the following
words: "Investigation discloses, however, that the lie detector test
has not yet reached that stage in its development where its results
are sufficiently reliable to be made the subject of expert testimony.
At present, this test is best suited for opening up avenues of investi-
gation and for procuring confessions and admissions." 44
The report noted that in the nineteenth century a student of the
problem of identification posed the question of what remedy would
42 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 32, at 235 (footnotes omitted).
48 Id. at 233.
44 Id. at 233-34.
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prevent erroneous identification. The only reply he could make was:
"It lies alone in caution and prudence. Observation and sad experience
admonish courts and juries to the use of utmost care, caution and pru-
dence." 45 The Council's report then inquires:
Must the twentieth century render the same response? In view of
the great advances made in the field of psychology it would seem
that we should know more about psychological factors which affect
identification. In the light of this knowledge, it might be possible
to erect legislative safeguards which would prevent or minimize the
recurrence of the tragic errors which have characterized the subject
of identification testimony.46
Unfortunately, however, the Council was compelled to conclude,
"On the basis of this study it is not believed that the problem of errone-
ous identification can be eased by statute or court rule."47
That was the best answer available thirty years ago to a question
asked in the nineteenth century. Now, as we stand on the threshold of
the twenty-first century, we must reexamine and reevaluate the conclu-
sions of the 1948 report in the light of present-day knowledge and ex-
perience. It is the purpose of this study to suggest that a better answer
may be found in the so-called lie detector or polygraph.
EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLYGRAPH
Although it had been in use since 1895, the polygraph 48 first came
to the attention of an appellate court in 1923 when the accused in a
45 Id. at 236, quoting HMs, A TREArsE ON THE LAW OF IDENTIFICATION 3 (1892).
46 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 32, at 236-37.
47 Id. at 234.
48The polygraph or so-called lie detector is premised on the theory that a person
who consciously lies undergoes physiological reactions which can be measured. The in-
strument records various physiological responses, such as changes in pulse rate, blood
pressure, respiration and electrodermal responses. The procedure entails comparing the
individual's reactions upon being asked three types of questions: (I) simple unrelated
questions that should cause no stress (e.g., "Are you 21 years old?"); (2) control questions
which are unrelated but will cause a certain amount of nervousness (e.g., "Have you ever
stolen anything?'); (3) questions related to the crime (e.g., "Did you steal from X store
on the 21st of January?"). A marked increase in the physical indicia between the second
and third type of question would indicate that the person is consciously lying with re-
spect to the relevant question. Of course, the accuracy of the conclusion depends greatly
on the examiner's ability to interpret the charts and detect other factors which may
affect the results, such as extreme dull-wittedness or psychosis. Reid, A Revised Question-
ing Technique in Lie-Dectection Tests, 37 J. Crm. L. & CRmiNoLOGY 542 (1947).
For a discussion on the theory and operation of the polygraph, see R. FERGUSON & A.
MILLER, THE POLYGRAPH IN COURT 143-321 (1973); R. FERGUSON & A. MnEmR, THE POLy-
GRAPH FOR THE DEFENSE 88-89, 127-28, 161-62, 173, 182, 221-22, 253 (1974); J. REI & F.
INBAU, TRUTH AND DECETION: THE POLYGRAPH (LIE-DETEcEOR) TCHNIQUE (1966) [herein-
after cited as REID & INBAu]; Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and
Limitations of the "Lie Detector," 46 J. Cuam. L. & CRIMINoLoGY 414 (1955); Cureton, A
Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L. REV. 728 (1953); Skol-
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murder trial offered as evidence the results of a Marston "systolic blood
pressure" test. In Frye v. United States,49 the court affirmed the exclu-
sion of such evidence.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line bet-ween
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this tvilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development,
and experiments thus far made.50
Though the Frye standard of general scientific acceptance has been
criticized as applying a more rigorous test for the lie detector than for
other types of scientific evidence, many jurisdictions still adhere to it.51
The New York Court of Appeals has consistently ruled against the
admission of polygraph evidence on the logic of Frye.52 In 1969, the
Court reexamined its exclusionary rule in People v. Leone.53 While
Leone was in police custody as a murder suspect, he agreed to submit
nick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YAr
L.J. 694 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Skolnick].
49 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
GoId. at 1014.
51 See, e.g., United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md.
1973); United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973); People v. York, 174
Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1941);
Stone v. Earp (civil), 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368,
37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert. denied,
343 U.S. 898 (1951); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206 (rex. Crim. App. 1973).
52 Pereira v. Pereira, 35 N.Y.2d 301, 319 N.E.2d 413, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1974); People
v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969); People v. Forte, 279
N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938). See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 75 Misc. 2d 823, 348 N.Y.S.2d
938 (Family Ct. Rockland County 1973); People v. Dodge, 72 Misc. 2d 345, 338 N.Y.S.2d
690 (Nassau County 1972); People v. Jacobson, 71 Misc. 2d 1040, 337 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1972); Tree v. Ralston, 62 Misc. 2d 582, 309 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Family Ct.
N.Y. County 1970); People v. Dobler, 29 Misc. 2d 481 (Suffolk County 1961).
But see In re Stenzel v. B, 71 Misc. 2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Family Ct. Niagara
County 1972), in which the court ordered a polygraph test to be given to the mother-pe-
titioner in a paternity suit. The alleged father offered the polygraph results to impeach
the credibility of the mother who had taken the stand. Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc.
2d 316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Queens County 1972), was an action for the balance due on a
loan which the defendant contended he never received. To resolve the credibility issue,
the court ordered a polygraph test to be administered, to which both parties consented.
63 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969).
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to a polygraph test, the results of which the prosecution intended to
submit in evidence. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence. In affirming, the Court concluded that the prose-
cution had failed "'to show a general scientific recognition that the
polygraph possesses efficacy.' "54 It was observed that
[a]lthough perfection in test results is not a prerequisite to the
admissibility of evidence obtainable by the use of scientific instru-
ments, the rule has been to grant judicial recognition only after the
instrument has been sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.
Applying this standard, it is clear that the record before us does
not adequately establish the reliability of the tests to be admissible
in evidence. As previously indicated, the criterion for interpretation
of the test chart has not as yet become sufficiently definite to be gen-
erally reliable so as to warrant judicial acceptance; nor can it be
said that the examiner's opinion demonstrates reasonable certainty
as to the accuracy of the polygraph test in most instances.55
The traditional arguments against admission of the polygraph cen-
ter upon the alleged unreliability of the instrument, the nonavailability
of experienced operators, and the adverse impact such evidence may
have on the trial process. The merits of these arguments will now be
considered.
One reason given for the polygraph's questionable accuracy is that
its reliability is dependent upon the physical or mental state of the
subject examined. The polygraph is designed to measure only conscious
lying; therefore a psychopathic liar or an extremely feeble person who
cannot distinguish between truth and falsehood are inappropriate sub-
jects for the polygraph. The machine would fail to detect their lies since
unconscious lying does not create a stressful situation with the attendant
physical responses. Critics also fear that an examinee's extreme nervous-
ness will be misinterpreted as an indication of lying. It will be recalled
that the nervous Balestrero was afraid of the same possibility. Neverthe-
less, despite his inner anxiety, the polygraph results were consistent with
the truth.
To guard against these dangers, a qualified examiner is indispens-
able. Both critics and proponents of the polygraph agree on the critical
role of the examiner. It is the examiner who must screen out inappro-
priate subjects, prepare the proper questions and interpret the test
results. Without standardization of qualifications, the court cannot be
confident of the reliability of a particular test result.
54 Id. at 517, 255 NXE.2d at 700, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 434-35, quoting People v. Forte, 279
N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938).
55 Id.
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The importance of the examiner's expertise was underscored in
Pereira v. Pereira,6 a recent decision by the New York Court of Ap-
peals. Mrs. Pereira charged her husband with knowledge of the where-
abouts of their daughter, over whom the court had given her custody.
The husband vehemently denied any such knowledge. Counsel for the
plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant would submit to
a polygraph examination. As in Leone the test was administered by a
police detective with limited experience in the procedure. Over the
defendant's objections, the trial court received the test results in evi-
dence. Relying heavily on Leone, the Court of Appeals ruled the poly-
graph results inadmissible. As the Court noted, the examiner was "not
sufficiently trained and expert to justify use of the tests in a court of
law." r7 The examiner who administered the test was still in training,
and this was the first time he had ever testified as to polygraph data.
His inexperience represented a "vital deficiency."58
Notwithstanding the employment of unqualified examiners, as in
the Pereira case, the polygraph has emerged from the "twilight zone" de-
picted in Frye and achieved a very substantial degree of reliability. The
modem polygraph is a much more sophisticated, complex, and accurate
recorder than the simple, crude device which was promptly and prop-
erly rejected in Frye. That machine registered only the systolic blood
pressure, whereas today's polygraphs, in addition to recording the reac-
tions in blood pressure, likewise graph the pulse, the respiration, and the
skin resistance to electric current i.e., galvanic skin response (G.S.R.).
In contexts other than the courtroom, it is common knowledge
that there has been a widespread and general acceptance of the poly-
graph, particularly within the last two decades. Its use today is almost
universal in governmental agencies, by prosecutors,59 police, public
and private investigators, commerce and industry, labor and manage-
ment,60 and in other recognized fields.
56 35 N.Y.2d 801, 319 N.E.2d 413, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1974).
57 Id. at 807, 319 N.E.2d at 417, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
58 Id. at 808, 319 N.E.2d at 47, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
59 A. WE=r, PRivAcy AND FREEnom 145-47 (1967), reports that more than half of the
police departments in the United States employ polygraphs in investigation. To the
knowledge of the writer, the polygraph is used extensively by many large district attor-
neys' offices in the country. Between 1956 and 1966 it was used in the Queens district
attorney's office in almost every case involving pure identification. It is presently used in
the district attorneys' offices in Manhattan and The Bronx and is used by the prosecutors
in more than thirty counties throughout California, particularly in relation to paternity
cases.
60 CoGB.L, Tim LiE DTEcrOR rN EmPLOYMENT 2-3 (1968). See Dolan v. Kelly, 76
Misc. 2d 151, 348 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978), upholding the dismissal of
a police officer for refusing to submit to a polygraph test pursuant to a departmental in-
vestigation of alleged misconduct of a fellow officer.
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The polygraph's increased use is a direct result of its demonstrated
reliability. Polygraphists claim an accuracy rate of as high as 95 per-
cent. 61 In an experiment conducted by Horvath and Reid,62 experienced
and inexperienced examiners68 were asked to determine guilt or inno-
cence on the basis of chart readings alone. None of the examiners had
the opportunity to observe the subjects' attitudes or behavior during
the testing. Ninety-one percent of the experienced examiners and sev-
enty-nine percent of the inexperienced were correct in their diagnoses.
Interestingly, errors favored the guilty over the innocent. Of the mis-
takes in judgment, 6.4 percent designated an innocent person guilty
and 10.8 percent exonerated those actually guilty. Furthermore, the
accuracy rate for all the relevant questions asked, i.e., those relating to
the crime, was 89 percent.64
As the Horvath-Reid experiment indicates, the degree of the ex-
aminer's experience does affect the test's reliability. Some states have
begun to set minimum standards for licensing purposes.6 5 Reid and
Inbau suggest that the following requirements be met before an ex-
aminer may testify: (1) he must have a college degree; (2) his experience
must include at least a six-month training period with an experienced
examiner; (3) he must have had at least five years experience as a spe-
cialist in the field.66
Legislative standards would undoubtedly assist the court in deter-
mining whether a proposed examiner is sufficiently qualified to tes-
tify. But the absence of such legislation should not preclude polygraph
evidence if the court can identify a qualified examiner within an ac-
ceptable amount of the court's time. As the federal district court in
United States v. DeBetham6 7 observed,
a qualified examiner can be adequately identified without consum-
ing more court time than is presently necessary to qualify any
61 REr & INBAu, supra note 48, at 234. Approximately 4.5% of the results were
dassified as unverified and .5% were in error.
62 Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and
Deception, 62 J. Cane. L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971).
68 The inexperienced examiners had from four to six months training.
64 This 89% figure is arrived at if inconclusive readings are not counted as errors.
65 See, e.g., ARK. ANN. STAT. § 71-2207 (Supp. 1973); FLA. ANN. SrAT. § 493.43 (Supp.
1974-75); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5007 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 202-11 (1973);
Ky. Rzv. STAT. ANN. ch. 329.030 (1970); N.M. ANN. SrAT. ch. 67-31A-6 (Supp. 1973); N.
CENTURY CODE ANN. tit. 43-31-07 (Supp. 1973); Tx. REv. Cxv. SrAT. ANN. art. 4413
(29cc), § 8 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-729.03 (Supp. 1974).
66 REiD & INBAU, supra note 48, at 257.
67 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). Though the district court's reasoning supported the admission
of unstipulated polygraph evidence, the court felt compelled to exclude such evidence on
the basis of earlier appellate decisions.
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physician or psychiatrist, and an incompetent examiner can be
discovered through the ordinary diligence expected of counsel in
preparation for cross-examination.6 8
Proponents of the polygraph not only allude to the increased re-
liability and use of the polygraph since the Frye decision, but also
challenge the standard of general scientific recognition. The standard
is criticized for its imposition of a more rigorous test for the lie detector
than for other types of scientific evidence8 9 As McCormick has stated,
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition upon the
court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions
which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be re-
ceived unless there are other reasons for exclusion.70
Furthermore, the more modem view would accord judicial recog-
nition upon the general acceptance by specialists within a profession or
field of science, even though the group as a whole may be completely
unfamiliar with the instrument or technique.71 This group may well
be, for the most part, the polygraphists themselves.
Such a modified test is not new and certainly not unique, since it
is constantly applied in many other areas involving scientific evidence.
For example, it is an accepted standard within the medical profession
for chemical tests for alcoholic intoxication. It is likewise readily ap-
proved in the field of radar with regard to the control of traffic.72 It has
also been generally accepted in cases involving the Nalline test for nar-
cotics in the human body.73
68Id. at 1386.
69 See McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 484,
500 (1927), where the author writes,
[I]f the test results are shown by scientific experience to render the inferences
of consciousness of falsity or truth substantially more probable, then the courts
should accept the evidence, though the possibility of error in the inference be
recognized.. . .Conclusiveness in the inference called for by the evidence is not
a requirement for admissibility.
See generally Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of its Place in the Law of Evi-
dence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 392-401 (1964); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy -A
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. Rv. 385, 412 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Trautman], both
supporting the position that all logically relevant circumstantial evidence should be ad-
mitted subject to policy considerations. But see Koffier, The Lie Detector-A Critical
Appraisal of the Technique as a Potential Undermining Factor of the Judicial Process, 3
N.Y.L.F. 123 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kofiler]; Radek, The Admissibility of Polygraph
Results in Criminal Trials: A Case for the Status Quo, 3 LoyoLA LJ. 289 (1972), support-
ing a higher standard of admissibility for the polygraph than for other scientific evidence.
70 C. McCopmimC, EvmENcE 491 (2d ed. 1972).
71 People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
72 State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
73 People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958). In Williams, defen-
dant challenged the admissibility of Nalline test results which indicated the presence of
1974]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Over the years the polygraph, in the hands of an experienced ex-
aminer, has demonstrated a substantial degree of accuracy and accep-
tance. But many of those who concede the test's probative value and
reliability maintain that the polygraph should be excluded for policy
reasons. Critics emphasize the undesirable impact polygraph testimony
might have on the trial process. Among the policy considerations mili-
tating against admission are: (1) the test results will be viewed as deter-
minative of guilt or innocence and thereby effectively replace the jury
as the trier of facts; (2) the technical testimony will create confusion in
the juror's minds; (8) an undue amount of time will be consumed.
The primary concern is that polygraph testimony will irreparably
prejudice the jury against one of the parties. After an acquittal verdict
in the one New York criminal case which admitted lie detector re-
suits,7 4 a questionnaire was sent to the jurors to determine the weight
such evidence was given. One question read: 'Were you so impressed
by the scientific value of the 'lie detector' that you accepted its testimony
without question?" Five of the ten jurors answering the questionnaire
responded in the affirmative. To the second question - "Did you base
your vote upon such testimony alone?" - six said yes.75
Other considerations focus upon the possibility of jury confusion
and the amount of time the introduction of polygraph evidence will
entail. It is feared that the trial will be reduced to a protracted battle
of experts beyond a juror's comprehension. The court in United States
narcotics in his system. The state's witnesses admitted that the use of Nalline had not
been generally accepted by the medical profession. Nevertheless, the court ruled that gen-
eral acceptance by those dealing with the narcotic problem was sufficient to establish
reliability.
74 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (County Ct. Queens County 1938),
impliedly overruled by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
75 Kofller, supra note 69, at 137-38. Koffier also reports the results of an experiment
conducted with 20 third-year law students. The students were presented with the follow-
ing fact pattern: A, returning home one night, sees a burglar rushing out his front door.
A was twenty-five feet from his house and a dim light illuminated the porch. Forty-eight
hours later, A identifies B as the culprit. C testifies that B was with him the night of
the burglary. On the basis of these facts all twenty students found B not guilty. The stu-
dents were then given the same fact pattern, with one additional fact- lie detector re-
sults indicated that B was lying when he said he did not burglarize the house. They were
also told that generally 85% of lie detector results were accurate, 14.5% were unverified,
and .5% were inaccurate. Eight of the students changed their innocent vote to guilty.
With the same facts, and upon being informed that the lie detector had a 95% accuracy
rate, 17 of the twenty students voted guilty. Id. at 139-43. One of Koffier's concerns is that
as the reliability of the polygraph increases so will the possibility of a miscarriage of jus-
tice for those few individuals who fall within the error range. Id. at 145-46.
76 For an interesting overview of the polygraph issue, see SUPREME COURT COMM. ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE STATE or NEw JmsEy JUDimAL CouciL, 96 NJL.J.,
May 10, 1973 (Index at 525) [hereinafter cited as NEw JERsEY REPORT]. While both the
majority and minority reports adopted the substantial showing of reliability and accep-
tance standard (as opposed to the rigorous general acceptance standard of Frye), the ma-
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v. Ridling77 addressed itself to this line of criticism. After determining
the reliability of the polygraph, Judge Joiner quickly put to rest the
fear that the polygraph's aura of scientific respectability would lead the
jury to give too much weight to test results. In fully sustaining the
ability of a jury to properly weigh such evidence, the court stated that
it is important to understand how different juries are today than
they were when the restrictive rules of evidence were first devel-
oped. On the whole they read widely. Largely because of television
they know generally what is going on in the world. Their educa-
tional background is extensive. They think. They reason. They are
really very good at sorting out good evidence from bad, of separat-
ing the credible witness from the incredible, and of disregarding
experts who attempt to inject their opinions into areas of which
they have little knowledge... A modem jury, that must deliber-
ate, and must agree, is the ideal body to evaluate opinions of this
kind. 8
Similarly, the district court in United States v. Zeiger,79 thought
the probative value of the polygraph outweighed policy considerations
against admission. In allowing polygraph testimony on defendant's mo-
tion, the court concluded that adequate safeguards, such as a thorough
foundation and vigorous cross-examination, were available to prevent
the evidence from having undue weight. Furthermore, the examiner
would not be permitted to give an opinion on the issue of guilt or in-
nocence, but only assess the truthfulness of specific answers and explain
the basis of his opinion.80
Despite the presence of safeguards, many continue to insist that
important elements of the trial should not be sacrificed to the probative
value of the polygraph. In response to such legitimate concerns, courts
have developed various approaches which permit the use of polygraph
evidence within prescribed limits.
One significant breakthrough in this area has been admission upon
stipulation of the parties as illustrated in State v. Valdez.8' There, the
jority thought the evidence should be excluded for policy reasons absent a prior
stipulation by the parties. The policy considerations which it listed were: (I) juries would
give conclusive weight to polygraphs; (2) a jury would draw an unfavorable inference if
the defendant failed to produce such evidence; (3) with the proliferation of polygraph
evidence, conflicting expert testimony will result in confusion and an inordinate consump-
tion of time. Id. at 21, col. 4. The minority, though, felt that the probative value of the
polygraph outweighs the traditional policy considerations. It urged the admission of re-
sults of all voluntary examinations upon the laying of a proper foundation. Id. at 23, ol.
2.
77350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
78Id. at 98.
79 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80 Id. at 691.
8191 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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defendant was charged with possession of narcotics. Before the trial, de-
fendant, his counsel and the county attorney entered into a stipulation
providing that the defendant submit to the test and that results of the
examination would be admissible. At the trial the defendant objected
to the submission of the results, which were unfavorable to him.
Although it rejected the contention that polygraph results should
be generally admitted on motion of either party,82 the Arizona court
concluded that the technique had advanced sufficiently to warrant its
admissibility upon stipulation.83 It held results to be admissible either
to corroborate other evidence of the defendant's participation in the
crime, or to corroborate or impeach the defendant's credibility if he
takes the stand.84
The conditions for admission were specified by the court as fol-
lows: (1) the prosecuting attorney, defendant, and his counsel must sign
a written stipulation that the defendant voluntarily submits to the test
and that the results may be introduced in evidence by either party; (2)
notwithstanding such a stipulation, it is within the court's discretion
to refuse to accept the evidence if it is not convinced of the examiner's
qualifications or that the test was conducted under proper conditions;
(3) if the evidence is admitted, the opposing party has the right to cross-
examine the examiner on his qualifications, the testing conditions and
the possibility for error; (4) the court should instruct the jury that the
test results only tend to show whether the defendant was lying or not
at the time of the examination -that they do not tend to prove or
disprove any element of the crime.8
The Valdez approach does not assume that the stipulation makes
the polygraph more reliable, but rather that it undercuts the policy
objections against using polygraph testimony in court. Why should the
trier of facts be deprived of probative evidence if the parties themselves
agree that the feared hazards are nonexistent or inconsequential?8 In
addition, the specified conditions tend to promote a high degree of test
reliability and guard against a jury's acceptance of the polygraph as the
final word on guilt or innocence. The procedure enunciated by Valdez
has been adopted by a number of jurisdictions.87
82 Id. at 280, 871 P.2d at 898.
83 Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 283-84, 871 P.2d at 900-01. See generally Hazlett, Admissibility of the Results
of a Lie-Detector Test, 5 AIz. L. REv. 76 (1963).
86 Trautman, supra note 67, at 397.
87 State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 582 (Fla. App. 1965) (oral agreement); State v. McDavitt,
62 N.J. 86, 297 A.2d 849 (1972); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 134 (1972); State
v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 780, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
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The Valdez situation is easily distinguished from the limited stip-
ulation contained in the New York case of Pereira v. Pereira.8 In that
case the issue before the Court centered on the defendant-husband's
credibility, i.e., whether he had knowledge of his child's whereabouts.
If so, he was in contempt of court for not informing the wife, who had
been given custody over the child. The stipulation entered into by the
prosecution and defense merely provided that the defendant would
submit to a polygraph examination; it contained no provision for the
subsequent use of the results at the trial, as was done in Valdez and
other stipulation cases in accord with Valdez. Thus, the Pereira fact
pattern permitted the Court of Appeals to avoid confronting the stip-
ulation issue squarely. It did not have to decide whether an all-inclusive
stipulation would be sufficient to overcome the policy objections raised
against the admission of polygraph evidence.
The facts in Pereira were more akin to those in People v. Leone,8 9
wherein the prosecutor wanted to use damaging results of a test volun-
tarily taken by the accused. In both intances the Court justly refused
to allow the evidence to be used against a defendant who did not ex-
pressly contemplate the judicial use of the polygraph. Voluntary sub-
mission is not the equivalent of a fall stipulation and should not serve
as its substitute.90
Of course, nothing would prevent a defendant from taking a pri-
vate, informal polygraph examination prior to entering into a formal
stipulation. "The Case of the Jamaican Accent," a dramatic wrong man
prosecution which recently appeared in the New York Times Magazine
indicates that this may be a wise procedure for defendants to take.91
The charges against the defendant were dropped only after a face-to-face
voice identification in which the victim positively concluded that the
defendant was not her attacker since the real robber spoke with what
See People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. Galloway, 167
N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1969); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968), recognizing that prior
stipulation alone is sufficient for admission. See also State v. Pulakis, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska
1970), upholding admission upon a showing of a clear intelligent waiver of the privilege
to exclude the evidence. See generally 53 A.L.R.8d 1005 (1973) on the various procedures
by which jurisdictions admit polygraph evidence.
88 Pereira v. Pereira, 35 N.Y.2d 301, 319 N.E.2d 413, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1974).
8925 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.YS.2d 430 (1969).
99But see State v. Alderete, 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (1974), holding that either
side has the right to rely on the test voluntarily taken by the defendant. It holds that a
court, in its discretion, may admit such evidence if: (1) the polygraphist is qualified; (2)
the proposed test is accepted in his profession; (3) it is demonstrated that the test is rea-
sonably precise in its measurements. See also the minority report in Nmv JERSEY REIPORr,
supra note 76 at 22, col. 1.
91 Herman, The Case of the Jamaican Accent, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1974, § 6 (Magazine),
at 30.
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she described as an "American Afro" while the defendant had a West
Indian accent. The victim, who had spent fifteen minutes with her at-
tacker, was also sure that the true perpetrator had a pierced ear while
the defendant did not. Ironically, at his lawyer's suggestion, the defen-
dant had eagerly submitted to a private polygraph test which indicated
that he was lying.92 Was the test administered properly? Was the ex-
aminer properly qualified? Or had the polygraph simply failed its mis-
sion? Since the test was administered "off the record," there would have
been no danger of prejudice in a stipulation jurisdiction. Had the de-
fendant entered into a stipulation without a preliminary examination,
he would have had the benefit of judicial scrutiny of the examiner and
the testing conditions prior to any in-court admission.
Admittedly, one limitation of the prior stipulation rule is that it
requires both parties to be convinced of the polygraph's probative value.
If the district attorney's office is not convinced of its reliability and,
therefore, refuses to enter into a stipulation, the accused is prevented
from submitting the evidence.9 Other courts have gone so far as to
admit unstipulated results on defendant's motion.94 In United States v.
Ridling,95 the defendant, who was faced with a perjury charge, offered
polygraph testimony of an expert of his own choosing. After hearing
extensive expert testimony, the court concluded that the polygraph, in
general, was reliable and went on to consider the policy considerations
against admission. On balance, it decided that the advantages to be
gained by admitting the evidence in a perjury case outweighed the
traditional objections to the polygraph.
Although Judge Joiner agreed that many of the polygraph exam-
iners and operators are deficient in training and experience, he sur-
mounted that problem by exercising the court's inherent power to
appoint its own qualified experts."" The court also set up stringent
preconditions for admission of the evidence:
1. The parties will meet and will recommend to the Court
92 Id. at 90.
98 See State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964), holding that the state
cannot be required to enter into a stipulation or give the test.
94 United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. (E.D. Mich. 1972) (mem.); United States
v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
United States v. Dioguardi, 350 F. Supp. 1177 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Hart, 344
F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1973),
rejecting Ridling. See generally Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73
CoLtrm. L. REv. 1120 (1973); Note, Problems Remaining for the "Generally Accepted"
Polygraph, 53 B.U.L. REv. 75 (1973).
95 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (mem.).
96 Id. at 97.
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three competent polygraph experts other than those offered by the
defendant.
2. The Court will appoint one or more of the experts to con-
duct a polygraph examination.
3. The defendant will submit himself for such examination
at an appointed time.
4. The expert appointed by the Court will conduct the exami-
nation and report the results to the Court and to the counsel for
both the defendant and the government.
5. If the results show, in the opinion of the expert, either that
the defendant was telling the truth or that he was not telling the
truth on the issues directly involved in this case, the testimony of
the defendant's experts and the Court's experts will be admitted.
6. If the tests indicate that the examiner cannot determine
whether the defendant is or is not telling the truth, none of the
polygraph evidence will be admitted.97
Recently, Massachusetts has joined those states which, unlike New
York, have modified their strict exclusion of polygraph evidence. In
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, s Massachusetts recognized the right of
a defendant to submit polygraph testimony under carefully defined
conditions. The case is particularly relevant to New York since both
states continue to adhere to the stringent standard of general scientific
recognition.99 The defendant, who was charged with manslaughter,
moved to admit test results of an examination conducted by experts of
his own choosing. He further moved that the court order an additional
examination by a court-appointed expert. Despite a showing of the
polygraph's high degree of reliability, the trial court felt compelled to
deny the motion absent a showing that the method's reliability had been
generally accepted by the scientific community. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Court reversed. While noting that the polygraph had not yet
met the Frye standard of gaining general admission on a par with other
scientific evidence, it thought that the testing technique had
advanced to the point where it could prove to be of significant value
to the criminal trial process if its admissibility is limited to carefully
defined circumstances designed to protect the proper and effective
administration of criminal justice ... if a defendant agrees in ad-
vance to the admission of the results of a polygraph test regardless
of their outcome, the trial judge, after a close and searching inquiry
into the qualifications of the examiner, the fitness of the defendant
for such examination, and the methods utilized in conducting the
tests, may, in the proper exercise of his discretion, admit the results,
97 Id. at 99.
98 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
99 See Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 846 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963).
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not as binding or conclusive evidence, but to be considered with all
other evidence as to innocence or guilt.100
As illustrated by Valdez, Ridling, and A Juvenile, courts are pres-
ently searching for guidelines to minimize the risks attending the ad-
mission of polygraph evidence, including undue influence on a jury
and the lack of standardized qualifications for examiners.
ADMISSION OF THE POLYGRAPH IN IDENTIFICATION CASES
The conclusion is inescapable that a comprehensive reexamination
and reevaluation of New York's prohibition on the admission of poly-
graph tests is long overdue. The entire thrust of modern thinking in
all areas of the law- practice, procedure, pleadings, and evidence -
indicates an abrupt departure from the straitjacket rules of the past.
A clear trend is presently discernible, on both state and federal levels,
towards admitting all relevant evidence that might legitimately aid the
triers of the facts in their ceaseless search for the truth. This tendency
toward broader acceptance of evidence, especially that of a scientific
nature, strongly suggests that uniform and consistent standards for the
admission of polygraph evidence under severe and strict court super-
vision should be adopted. If the polygraph cannot be used as a positive
standard saying "that is the man," perhaps it can serve as a negative
standard indicating that "that is not the man."
The need to modify New York's exclusionary rule is greatest in
the area of pure identification cases. For a person in Balestrero's posi-
tion, it might be the only means of exculpation available. Balestrero
was faced with the testimony of four eyewitnesses who had positively
identified him. As another court queried, are we "so confident of the
reliability of the present system of resolving conflicts in testimony by
impeachment, cross-examination and inferences from demeanor, that
we can afford to reject scientific aid in the task?"''1 1
Though it may be argued that the polygraph test has not achieved
the same degree of general scientific recognition as fingerprinting and
ballistics testing, clearly it has achieved substantial recognition. Granted,
policy considerations may militate against the admissibility of the poly-
graph in all cases. But against these considerations, one must balance
the possibility of a conviction based on evidence substantially less re-
liable than the polygraph, namely, eyewitness identification.
1o0 Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Mass. 1974).
101 United States v. DeBetham, 548 F. Supp. 1377, 1384 (S.D. Cal.), aJJ'd per curiam,
470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973), paraphrasing C. McCoRmIcm,
EvIDENcE 369-70 (1954).
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The question undoubtedly arises that if the reliability of the poly-
graph is acknowledged, why should its use be limited to identification
cases? First, notwithstanding the arguments herein presented, there still
remain a number of unanswered questions concerning impact and re-
liability. The most outspoken proponents of the polygraph admit that
in a certain percentage of cases, howsoever small, the test results will be
inaccurate. Furthermore, studies do tend to show that juries will at
times ignore other good evidence in favor of the polygraph results.102
It is the contention of this writer that in pure identification cases -
prosecutions where the case against the defendant is based entirely on
eyewitness testimony -the only effective means for the defendant to
exculpate himself may be through the polygraph. As previously indi-
cated, neither the Wade protections nor cross-examination of the iden-
tifying witnesses is a sufficient safeguard for the accused. 03 Thus, the
risks presented by the polygraph are worth accepting when there exists
the grave possibility of convicting a totally innocent man.
Moreover, due process may require that a state's rules of evidence
give way where exculpatory evidence, which is at least substantially
reliable and which may be the only effective means for the defendant
to prove his innocence, is sought to be admitted. The United States
Supreme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi °4 held the state's hearsay
rules must yield to the defendant's due process rights under certain
circumstances.
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses.... In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required
of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence.... The testimony rejected by
the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness
and... was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances,
where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of
guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanis-
tically to defeat the ends of justice.105
Much of what was said as to the exclusion of the hearsay evidence in
102 See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
104 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (8-1 decision).
105 Id. at 302 (citations omitted). However, the Court did note that:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principle of constitutional law.
Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded
to the State in the establishment and the implementation of their own criminal
rules and procedures.
Id. at 302-03.
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Chambers applies with equal force to polygraph evidence in an identi-
fication case.
Opponents might argue that formal, in-court admissibility is un-
necessary in identification cases since no prosecutor would proceed with
such a case in the face of an informal polygraph examination indicating
the defendant's innocence. The hard reality of the situation is that at
the present time a number of prosecutors' offices in the State of New
York, and presumably elsewhere, will neither consider informal test
results obtained by the defendant nor administer their own examina-
tion to a willing defendant. A rule admitting polygraph evidence would
encourage its informal use and obviate the need for a trial in many
cases.
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES
The following guidelines are proposed as a possible solution to the
polygraph problems facing appellate courts in New York, as well as the
rest of the nation. By admitting polygraph results in the limited area
of identification cases, the courts will be able to evaluate the impact of
such evidence on the judicial process and establish further guidelines
for its future use.
(1) The rule of Frye should be modified. In so doing, courts may
adopt either of the following approaches:
(a) Polygraph evidence should be admitted in the discretion of the
trial court on the basis of a balancing test. The degree of reli-
ability and the risk of impact would be measured against those
considerations in the particular case which call for admission.
This would allow admission in possible "wrong man" cases as
well as any other compelling factual circumstances which may
arise. Furthermore, as the reliability increases, so, too, may the
possible uses of the polygraph.
(b) As in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,10 courts may continue to
adhere to the Frye rule but allow admission in "carefully defined
circumstances designed to protect the proper and effective ad-
ministration of criminal justice."''1 7 This would permit an
appellate court to delineate and more closely supervise those
instances where the polygraph will be admitted. Initially, ad-
mission should be limited to those cases involving pure iden-
tification.
(2) Admission should be further restricted to those cases where
the defense has agreed and stipulated to the administration of the test,
as well as its subsequent admission at trial, regardless of outcome. The
10: 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974). See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
107 313 N.E.2d at 124.
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defendant should further acknowledge his understanding of the pro-
cedure. There appears no valid reason to require the consent and ap-
proval of the prosecution. Otherwise, a prosecutor who continues to
reject the use of the polygraph could frustrate the very policy reasons
militating in favor of its admission. Judicial supervision would insure
that the polygraph is admitted only in proper cases.
(3) All possible methods of selecting and qualifying the expert
should be explored. A licensing system for polygraph experts should be
considered. Regardless of the methods of selection, the main thrust must
be to insure that there be no repetition of the scandalous situation pres-
ently existing in many areas of expert testimony. In all too many cases,
each side seeks to retain an expert who will give the most favorable
testimony, not necessarily the correct or best opinion. The court must
be completely satisfied as to the competency of the examiner. In the
interim the following simple rules should be applied:
(a) Should the prosecution wish to join in the defendant's stipu-
lation to the administering of the polygraph, then the parties
may also agree as to the selection of the examiner. This stipu-
lation, of course, would not alone be grounds for admission of
the results. Absent such an agreement, the court should appoint
the expert from a list of qualified operators.10s
(b) After the administration of the test and prior to a court ruling
on admissibility, the expert in a pretrial evidentiary hearing
must be fully cross-examined as to his education, background,
and experience. In this regard, it must be always remembered
that the polygraph technique involves a diagnostic procedure
and is not a mere mechanical operation. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that the prime requisite to its effectiveness and
reliability is the competence of the examiner.
(c) In addition, the court must closely scrutinize the circumstances
and conditions surrounding the administration of the test and
must carefully examine the underlying charts, data, and
graphs upon which the opinion of the examiner is predicated.
(d) Where the court entertains doubts about the reliability of either
the test or the examiner, it should refuse to admit the results.
(4) If the evidence is admitted by the court, the jury"09 must be
carefully charged:
(a) The instructions must stress that the results of the test are not
108 United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (mem.).
109 As to nonjury cases, assuming the reliability of the polygraph, the argument that
the trier of the facts would tend to invest the testimony with scientific infallibility, falls
of its own weight. In light of the full discretion granted a trial judge, as to both the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, it would seem to be totally
inconsistent to deny him any evidence which would assist him in finding the truth.
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direct proof of guilt or innocence; that the test must at all
times be regarded and considered for what it is - an aid to the
court and the jury in the ceaseless search for the truth, and it is
not a substitute for either court or jury; that the test is neither
an absolute nor the ultimate determinant; finally, that the test-
timony of the examiner is no more than opinion evidence, the
weight and effect of which is a question of fact for the jury as
it weighs all the evidence in the case.
(b) The full charge on the function of expert testimony must be
given carefully and in detail. In substance, it must be made
apparent that this evidence is admitted to aid the jury in reach-
ing a decision in the context of all the evidence.
These guidelines should not prove burdensome. At a pretrial, pre-
polygraph hearing the trial court would determine whether, according
to the established standards, the circumstances warrant administration
of the test. The examiner would also be selected at this time. In a pre-
trial, post-polygraph hearing the court would scrutinize the testing
conditions and results. It would also hear any additional arguments
regarding the examiner's qualifications. At the trial the parties would
examine the polygraphist in the same manner as any other expert
witness. At the end of the trial, the jury would be charged in accordance
with the above guidelines.
CONCLUSION
There remains unanswered the haunting inquiry of the nine-
teenth century student: "What would really prevent erroneous identi-
fication?"" 0 In the most perfect of worlds and with all the suggested
guidelines adopted, perfected, implemented and in full force and effect,
inequities, inequalities and injustices will continue to exist-at least in
this life. The tragedy of Balestrero will always be possible, but I
suggest that our continued failure to embrace, within the concept of
this paper, all proper scientific aids in this troubled area of the law,
"will only serve to question the ability of the courts to efficiently ad-
minister justice." ''
110 See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
111 Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
